Working projects
These days, I study how international organizations navigate evolving global power dynamics -- such as the rise of China, emerging market economies , and authoritarian states -- focusing on the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, United Nations, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Authoritarian states have emerged as central players in major international organizations (IOs). We argue that this structural shift at least partially explains the recent public backlash against IOs in democratic countries. As more authoritarian states gain influence within IOs, democratic citizens become more skeptical of the IOs' decision-making procedures and their capacity to uphold liberal values. Across four survey experiments in two democracies--the United States and South Korea---focusing on two major IOs---the UN Security Council and the IMF---we find that democratic publics are less willing to comply with or remain in IOs that grant more institutional authority to authoritarian member states. This pattern holds across both countries for the UNSC and in the U.S. for the IMF, including among individuals that prior studies expect to be supportive of multilateralism. These findings have important implications for the future of institutionalized multilateralism amid the rise of authoritarian states.
Debt crises in developing countries are becoming increasingly prominent. To promote sustainable sovereign borrowing and lending, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank jointly assess countries’ debt risks and issue Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA). Since its introduction in 2005, the DSA framework has become a cornerstone of sovereign lending and borrowing, guiding both public and private lending practices. Although the DSA’s stated goal is to provide technical assessments, we find that geopolitical dynamics systematically influence the content of DSA reports. Using an original dataset of over 1,013 DSAs for low-income countries from 2005 to 2024, we show that countries politically aligned with the United States tend to receive more favorable risk ratings, more positive text, and more optimistic debt forecasts, relative to their economic fundamentals. In contrast, countries aligned with China receive less favorable risk ratings and more pessimistic debt forecasts. Our findings highlight the geopolitical influence on international financial institutions and the tensions between great powers in sovereign financing.
To what extent do rising powers use new international organizations (IOs) to challenge established institutions? While past scholarship shows that the World Bank has strategically responded to the rise of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), we know less about whether the AIIB is equally strategic in its project allocation. Using information on all 354 AIIB projects and novel data on project team leaders, we find that the AIIB is more likely to allocate projects and assign experienced bureaucrats to countries that have previously received World Bank financing. Additional analyses suggest that this pattern reflects the AIIB’s strategic focus on targeting the World Bank’s existing clients. On the contrary, we find no evidence for demand-side explanation, nor that the China-led institution would target "safe'' borrowers for information or risk-management purposes. These findings suggest that China uses new IOs to expand its influence among states at the center of the U.S.-led global order.
