Working projects
These days, I study how international organizations navigate evolving global power dynamics -- such as the rise of China, emerging market economies , and authoritarian states -- focusing on the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, United Nations, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Member Regime Type and Public Support for International Organizations
(with Hohyun Yoon)
Major international organizations (IOs) recently have experienced strong backlash. We argue that this backlash can be partially explained by the joint influence of regime type and changing power balance among member states within IOs. As many authoritarian states gain significant influence within IOs, democratic citizens become less supportive of the IOs due to concerns about the IO’s decision-making procedures and ability to uphold liberal values. Across four survey experiments in two democracies -- the United States and South Korea -- and in the context of two major IOs -- the UN Security Council and the IMF -- we find consistent evidence that democratic publics are less willing to comply with or remain in IOs that grant more institutional authority to authoritarian member states because they perceive the IOs to be less fair, less beneficial, and less competent. This skepticism often extends beyond the IOs in question with public withdraws their support for overall institutionalized multilateralism. Our findings reveal a previously underappreciated driver of public backlash against IOs: the regime type of influential member states. They underscore how shifting power dynamics within global institutions can erode domestic support for institutionalized multilateralism.
The Geopolitics of Debt Sustainability Analysis (with Mengfan Cheng and Peter B. Rosendorff)
Debt crises in developing countries are becoming increasingly prominent. To promote sustainable sovereign borrowing and lending, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank jointly assess countries’ debt risks and issue Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA). Since its introduction in 2005, the DSA framework has become a cornerstone of sovereign lending and borrowing, guiding both public and private lending practices. Although the DSA’s stated goal is to provide technical assessments, we find that geopolitical dynamics systematically influence the content of DSA reports. Using an original dataset of over 1,013 DSAs for low-income countries from 2005 to 2024, we show that countries politically aligned with the United States tend to receive more favorable risk ratings, more positive text, and more optimistic debt forecasts, relative to their economic fundamentals. In contrast, countries aligned with China receive less favorable risk ratings and more pessimistic debt forecasts. Our findings highlight the geopolitical influence on international financial institutions and the tensions between great powers in sovereign financing.
Not Two Worlds: China's Multilateralism and the Strategic Allocation of AIIB Projects (with Tuuli-Anna Huikuri)
How do rising powers compete with established financial institutions? This paper shows how China strategically uses the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to expand its influence and build legitimacy. Rather than focusing on bilateral relations with China, the AIIB preferentially funds states that are beneficiaries of an established U.S.-led institution, the World Bank (WB). By targeting these countries, China cultivates support within the existing hegemon’s sphere of influence while avoiding perceptions of overt political manipulation. Using a newly constructed dataset of all 326 AIIB projects and an instrumental variable approach, we find that WB beneficiaries are significantly more likely to receive AIIB financing, whereas bilateral ties with China matter less. These findings highlight how U.S. allies retain privileged status in the evolving global order and demonstrate the continued role of international organizations in the midst of global power shifts.
