Working projects
These days, I study how international organizations navigate evolving global power dynamics -- such as the rise of China, emerging market economies , and authoritarian states -- focusing on the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, United Nations, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Who Governs Matters: Member States' Regime Types and Public Support for International Organizations (with Hohyun Yoon)
How does growing influence of authoritarian states affect public support for international organizations (IOs)? We argue that influential member states’ regime type provides citizens with a cue for evaluating IO legitimacy in democracies. As democratic publics generally associate nondemocracies with opaque governance practices and illiberal interests, information that nondemocracies are gaining greater institutional influence in an IO may reduce public support for the affected IO. Across four survey experiments in two democracies--the United States and South Korea---focusing on two major IOs---the UN Security Council and the IMF---we find that democratic publics are generally less willing to comply with or remain in IOs when governance reforms are described as empowering authoritarian rather than democratic states. These findings have important implications for the future of institutionalized multilateralism amid the rise of authoritarian states.
Debt crises in developing countries are becoming increasingly prominent. To promote sustainable sovereign borrowing and lending, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank jointly assess countries’ debt risks and issue Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA). Since its introduction in 2005, the DSA framework has become a cornerstone of sovereign lending and borrowing, guiding both public and private lending practices. Although the DSA’s stated goal is to provide technical assessments, we find that geopolitical dynamics systematically influence the content of DSA reports. Using an original dataset of over 1,013 DSAs for low-income countries from 2005 to 2024, we show that countries politically aligned with the United States tend to receive more favorable risk ratings, more positive text, and more optimistic debt forecasts, relative to their economic fundamentals. In contrast, countries aligned with China receive less favorable risk ratings and more pessimistic debt forecasts. Our findings highlight the geopolitical influence on international financial institutions and the tensions between great powers in sovereign financing.
Not Two Worlds: International Staff Mobility and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (with Tuuli-Anna Huikuri)
China's creation of new international organizations has raised concerns that global economic governance will fragment into rival geopolitical blocs. We examine this possibility, focusing on the first decade of lending by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) spearheaded by China. Counter to the concerns about global division, we show that AIIB lending closely mirrors World Bank lending. We suggest that one important driver of this overlap is internationally mobile staff: the AIIB hires professionals with project management experience from established development institutions to benefit from their expertise. Utilizing original data of 196 AIIB project leaders' professional backgrounds, and interviews with AIIB staff, we find that former World Bank officials are well represented in AIIB project leadership, and these World Bank-experienced officials are more likely to lead subsequent AIIB projects in the country that they have previously worked on World Bank projects. Our findings suggest that staff mobility can facilitate institutional continuity even amidst geopolitical competition.
